The royal commentaries of Peru : in two parts / written originally in spanish by the Inca Garcilasso de la Vega; rendred into english by sir Paul Rycaut.

Royai Commentaries. . By means of the great diligence whicb was ufed half the Army was paífed over by midnighc: The firíl: thac were over, pmting Lhemfelves inco the beíl: arder they could began to clirnb che Mounrain, being defirous to poífe'5 chemfelves of tbe tóp befare rhe Enemies were come C.which was ·the greateft danger they fea- red) for having feifed chat Pafs, they m1ghc fecure the way, and facilitare rhe afcent o( che whole Army. Thofe in the ,Van having gotten half way up the Mountaio, a falfe alarm was given, ·no man knows how nor fn::im whence', wb1ch caufed foch a·general conílernacion and confufion, that many of thofe w.h0 were notas yet paffed over, both Horfe and Fooc ran away as if rhey had been pUrfued; and fo general was rhe affrightment and 1 terrour, chat rhe Captains Pórcel and Par- daue, and Gabriel Roja.s Captain of the Ordnance, and .divers other Soeldiers of ,note, who weFe in che Rere Guards and in the rnai'n Body, feeing wirh whar coo- fufion and diforder rhe Souldiers were put into füght, faid one to anorher, if chis alarm be rrue we fhall al! be !oíl: and defeaced this nighr. But as good forcune would have ir, che alarm proving falte, the dillurbance and naife was quieted, and chofe rhar fled rallied again, and every one made che beíl: oí his way rhar he could. .Thofe who were in the Van, and were che firll to climb the Mounraio, were Jikewife füuck wirh rhe fame terrour, and ran away wirh tbeir Arms: but rhe alarm appearing to be falfe, they proceeded on their way, and came to che Foun· rain before break oí day; which was the place where rohn de Acojfa was to have lain in wait for chem, had he obferved the Orders of Francifco de Carvajal, in per- fonnance of which che whole forcune and fuccefs of chat day depended. Thofe who carne to the Foumain, having quenched cheir thiríl: with thofepleafanrWa- ters, proceeded on their way, and having goc to tbe cop of the Moumain, they pm themfelves imo a Body; bur they were fo few, ano chofe withour any Com- mander, that fifcy meo might eafily have defeated them; howfoever in a fhort time afrer their numbers increafed, for che General Pedro de Hinojafa, and the Go- vernour Pedro de Valdivia, who had paffed che Bridge, and remained at rhe foot of the· Mounrnin, animated rhe Meo, and encouraged them to make good their afcenr: The other half oí che Army, being affrighted with the late alartn, did not pafs the Bridge with their Ordnance uotill nine a Clock in the morning; which having done, they m:irched :ifter rheir companions wirh ali diligence imaginable; and here we will leave rhem to fee what was become oí'/ohn de LJ.cojfa, who was deparced from Co;:;co ro hinder rhe Enemy from pa'ffing rhe River. · This Caprain having received his Infüufüons and Difp:itches from the Lieute- nam-General, departed from rhe City wirh two hundred Mufquetiers mounted on Horfe-back, and thirty Lances, all choice men ; and having marched che firíl: four leagues, he there ílaid and lodged ali night, comrary to the orders and dired:ions which had been given him; and fo negligem and carelefs he feemed to be 1 rhat cwo oí his Souldiers rnok an opporcunicy to leave him, and give advice muo che Enemy oí his comiog: The next morning about feven a Clock he began his march again, and that day another of bis Souldiers ran away, called '/ohn Nunne:t de Prado a Nacive of Badajo?:., who gave intelligence of the difiance, che Enemy was from chem, and of che Orders given by Carvajal, which were fo exaét and re~ guiar thar every ching was meafured by hiours and leagues; which gave che Prefi~ dent and his Caprains fome rhoughts and apprehenfion oí matters which were to fucceed : for when rhey underllood, chat an alarm was ta be given ac fuch an hour in rhe night, rhey were excremely fearfull lell it fhould caufe fome grear dif- order; for ií che lace falte alarm had put rhem into che confufion before menrio- ned, whac could they imagine would be che effeéts of a true alarm, caufed by a furprife in the nighc ? but by the negligence and unafüve fpirit of '/ohn de Acojfa none oí thefe marrers were put in afüon, but ali the rnethods and rules failed ; which was objeéted to Gonfalo Pifarr'o as a failure in his conduét, as A11t,u.ftine Ca- rate, Book the fevenrh Chapter the fourrh, intimares, where .fpeaking of che Squa- dron wbich che Prefident formed of Jndians and Negroes, he adds farther, That when '/ohn de Acojfa fent his Spyes to furvey che number oí the Enemy's Camp, and receiving a report that cbey were very numerous, he durft not engage wich them, bue returned again for a grearer force; by whith over-fight and de- fault che Prefident gained time to finifh his Bridge, and tranfport his Souldiers. And here it is thac Pifarrº was much blamed for his conduét, for had he placed onely a hundred men at each of thefe Paffes, it had been impoílible far the Enemy to have made good their way over che Water: with which faying Carare ends that Chapeer.